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NOTES

BATCH v. TOWN OF CHAPEL HILL. Takings Law and
Exactions: Where Should North Carolina Stand?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1990, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in Batch v.
Town of Chapel Hill1 that the Town of Chapel Hill had proper
authority to deny the grant of a subdivision permit to Dr. Dierdre
Batch because her application failed to "take into account ...
future road plans"2 set out by the town's Thoroughfare Plan. The
court based its holding on a North Carolina statute3 which allows
a town subdivision control ordinance to require a developer to
account for both present and future road development when drawing up subdivision plans. The court refused to address the takings
claim that Dr. Batch also advanced, holding that because the town
had properly denied the subdivision permit, it was unnecessary to
address the constitutional claims.4 Thus, the court posited, the
case had been decided upon "adequate and independent state
grounds."5
The court's decision to affirm the Town of Chapel Hill's denial
of Dr. Batch's subdivision permit based on technicalities of state
law indicates an unwillingness by the court to address constitutional issues. In the last decade perhaps no topic has been so
hotly debated as Fifth Amendment takings law claims. With the
recent United States Supreme Court decisions of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission6 in 1987 and Dolan v. City of Tigard'
in 1994, the United States Supreme Court has begun to lay a
foundation for determining when a government regulation or
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 326 N.C. 1, 387 S.E.2d 655 (1990).
Id. at 12, 387 S.E.2d at 662.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-372 (1994).
Batch, 326 N.C. at 14, 387 S.E.2d at 663.
Id. at 15, 387 S.E.2d at 664.
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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exaction is unconstitutional. The North Carolina Supreme Court
has traditionally been reluctant to address such takings law
issues. Such reluctance may stem from the fact that since takings
law is still an evolving field, the court fears a decision today may
face later reversal by the United States Supreme Court. However,
the North Carolina Supreme Court cannot continue to decide
important constitutionally charged cases on mere technicalities.
This note argues that the North Carolina Supreme Court
improperly decided Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill by ruling on a
mere technicality. Instead the court should have focused on the
nature of the town's ordinance and the required exaction and
should have addressed Dr. Batch's takings claim. Proper analysis
of Dr. Batch's claim indicates that the condition the Town of
Chapel Hill imposed was an unconstitutional exaction.
Part I of this note sets out the factual background and issues
raised by the Batch decision and details the reasoning of both the
North Carolina Court of Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme
Court in ruling on the issues. Part II analyzes the courts' holdings
on the takings claim issue and concludes that a taking did occur.

II.
A.

BATCH V. ToWN OF CHAPEL

HILL

FactualBackground

On September 16, 1986, Dr. Deirdre Batch applied to the
Town of Chapel Hill for a permit to subdivide a twenty-acre tract
into eleven individual lots within the extraterritorial planning
jurisdiction of the Town.' In 1983, prior to Dr. Batch's purchase of
the land, the Town of Chapel Hill had adopted a Thoroughfare
Plan for the Chapel HilllCarrboro area. 9 This Thoroughfare Plan
included future plans to develop a limited access highway, called
the Laurel Hill Parkway, part of which would pass directly
through the northeast section of Dr. Batch's property. 10
Dr. Batch's subdivision plans did not accommodate for this
proposed highway because at the time of her application for a permit, the road was not yet in existence. After reviewing Dr. Batch's
subdivision application, Chapel Hill planning staff denied her permit on three bases, only two of which are relevant to a takings law
analysis:
8. Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 92 N.C. App. 601, 603, 376 S.E.2d 22, 24
(1989).
9. Batch, 326 N.C. at 4, 387 S.E.2d at 657.

10. Id.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol21/iss1/5

2

1998]

EXACTIONS
LAW
Arias: Batch v.TAKINGS
Town of Chapel
Hill AND
- Takings
Law and Exactions: Where S

1. Plaintiff failed to indicate on her subdivision plat an intent
to dedicate to the Town of Chapel Hill a right-of-way through her
property for the proposed Laurel Hill Parkway.
2. Plaintiff failed to indicate on her subdivision plat an intent
to dedicate to the Town an additional ten feet of right-of-way along
Old Lystra Road and to improve Old Lystra Road by adding an
additional twelve feet of pavement width as well as curb and gutter along the property's approximately 973 feet of frontage on that
road. "
On March 9, 1987, the Chapel Hill Town Council adopted its
staffs recommendation and denied Dr. Batch's application. 1 2 No
other deficiencies in Dr. Batch's subdivision application were
brought to her attention other than those three given by the planning staff,13 yet the Town Council stated the reasons for the denial
of the application in very broad terms. One of the four reasons the
Council gave for the denial was that the permit application "[d] oes
not have streets which coordinate with existing and planned
streets and highways"1 4 as required by the town's Development
Ordinance. However, Town Planning Board minutes from an earlier January 6, 1987 meeting indicate that denial of the application was recommended because of Dr. Batch's "failure to
incorporate the extension of the Laurel Hill Parkway... and failure to agree to widen Old Lystra Road." 5
Following the denial of her subdivision permit by the Chapel
Hill Town Council, Dr. Batch filed a Writ of Certiorari and a Complaint in Superior Court, seeking a declaration that the denial of
her application was unlawful and unconstitutional. 6 She sought
both an injunction compelling the Town of Chapel Hill to grant
her subdivision permit and she claimed that the denial of her permit constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment of
17
the Constitution.
The trial court ruled that the Writ of Certiorari and the Complaint were properly joined.' 8 The court found that Dr. Batch had
11. Batch, 92 N.C. App. at 603, 376 S.E.2d at 24.
12. Id.
13. Appellee's Brief to the N.C. Court of Appeals at 3, Batch v. Town of Chapel
Hill, 92 N.C. App. 601 (1989).
14. Batch, 92 N.C. App. at 604, 376 S.E.2d at 25.
15. Defendant Appellant's Brief to the N:C. Court of Appeals at 6, Batch v.
Town of Chapel Hill, 92 N.C. App. 601 (1989).
16. Batch, 326 N.C. at 8, 376 S.E.2d at 660.
17. Id.
18. Batch, 92 N.C. App. at 604, 376 S.E.2d at 25.
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been deprived of her constitutional rights and that her property
had been temporarily taken.1 9 The court granted summary judgment 20 for Dr. Batch and ordered the Town of Chapel Hill to grant
her subdivision permit. 2 ' The Town of Chapel Hill appealed.
B.

The North CarolinaCourt of Appeals Opinion

In a detailed and lengthy opinion, the Court of Appeals analyzed each part of Dr. Batch's claim and determined:
a) The trial judge had correctly allowed Dr. Batch to join her
Writ of Certiorari with her Complaint.22
b) The subdivision permit was denied because Dr. Batch
failed to indicate an intent to dedicate portions of her tract as
rights of way for the Laurel Hill Parkway and for expansion of Old
Lystra Road. 2 3
c) The rational-nexus test set out by Nollan is the proper test
to be adopted in North Carolina and applied to this case.24
Thus, the Court held that Town of Chapel Hill's requirement
that Dr. Batch dedicate a right of way for the Laurel Hill Parkway
constituted an exaction that upon application of the Nollan test 25
proved to be unconstitutional.2 6 The Court remanded the issue of
whether the required dedication of a ten-foot strip of Old Lystra
Road constituted an unconstitutional exaction.2 7
19. Id.
20. The Trial Court set out three conclusions of law in its summary judgment
order, the first of which was as follows:
Defendant's denial of Plaintiffs subdivision on the basis of Plaintiffs
failure to dedicate a right of way necessary to accommodate the
proposed Laurel Hill Parkway ... constitutes a temporary taking of that
portion of the Plaintiffs property shown within the proposed right of
way alignment of the Laurel Hill Parkway... and unless compensation
is paid . . . the town's denial is in violation of the 5th and 14th
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Batch, 92 N.C. App. at 610, 376 S.E.2d at 28.
21. Batch, 92 N.C. App. at 604-605, 376 S.E.2d at 25.
22. Id. at 608, 376 S.E.2d at 27.
23. Id. at 609, 376 S.E.2d at 27.
24. Id. at 616, 376 S.E.2d at 31.
25. It bears noting that the Dolan decision had not yet been handed down.
Thus, the Nollan test was the only applicable test that the North Carolina Court
of Appeals used to determine if an exaction was unconstitutional.
26. Batch, 92 N.C. App. at 622, 376 S.E.2d at 35.
27. Id. at 625, 376 S.E.2d at 36. This note will focus only on the Laurel Hill
Parkway condition and not the Old Lystra Road condition.
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The Court of Appeals did not address the issues in this case
from a traditional takings law analysis. Instead the court applied
the test set out in Nollan, the first time a North Carolina court
had ever addressed the question of whether an exaction constituted an unconstitutional taking. 28 The Nollan test replaced the
less stringent "reasonable relationship" 29 test with the "essential
nexus" test.30 This test required that there be an essential nexus
between the exaction required and the goal of the regulation, i.e.
the exaction had to "substantially advance [a] legitimate state
interest. '3 1 The court noted that when an exaction constitutes a
physical taking of land (as the right of way required in Dr. Batch's
case would), it does not matter "whether the condition imposed
has only a minimal economic impact on the owner."3 2 The only
relevant inquiry is whether the exaction meets the essential nexus
test.
In its analysis of the essential nexus test, the court held that
current statutory authority indicated that the North Carolina legislature believed it was the appropriate test to apply.3 3 The court
pointed to several sections of N.C.G.S. § 160A-372 and held that
"[reading the subdivision enabling statute as a whole, . . . it is
clear the legislature contemplated that exactions can only be
imposed without compensation when the exaction condition meets
a need created by the development and that as a result of the
exaction there will be a commensurate benefit to the
subdivision."3 4
The court then set out the test for determining whether an
exaction amounts to an unconstitutional taking:
1. Identify the condition imposed.
2. Identify the regulation which caused the condition to be
imposed
3. Determine whether the regulation substantially advances
a legitimate state interest.

28. Id. at 614, 376 S.E.2d at 30.
29. This test merely required that the exaction be reasonably related to a
town planning goal. Batch, 92 N.C. App. at 615, 376 S.E.2d at 31.
30. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
31. Id. at 834.
32. Batch, 92 N.C. App. at 614, 376 S.E.2d at 30.
33. Id. at 616, 376 S.E.2d at 31.
34. Id. at 620, 376 S.E.2d at 33.
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4. If the regulation does substantially advance a legitimate
state interest, determine whether the condition imposed advances
that interest.
5. Determine whether the condition imposed is proportionally
related to the impact of the development.3 5
In applying this test, the court held that the condition
36
imposed was that Dr. Batch "dedicate, accommodate, or reserve"
a portion of her land as a right of way for the proposed Parkway.
The court then identified the regulation relied on in imposing this
condition as §6.5.1 and §7.7.1 of the Chapel Hill Development
Ordinance which required that the streets serving a subdivision
be in compliance with the Transportation Plan and the Comprehensive Plan of the town.3 7 The court assumed that a dedication
of a right of way substantially advances a legitimate state interest
of keeping streets and roads in compliance with the Comprehensive Plan. Thus satisfying the third and fourth prongs of the test.
The court then concluded that the Parkway condition failed to
meet the last portion of the test, thus making it an unconstitutional exaction. 8 The condition was held to be not "proportionally
related to the impact of the development, and there is no commensurate benefit to the subdivision for its forfeit of land." 39 This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Town of Chapel Hill had
provided for the proposed parkway on the Thoroughfare Plan
before Dr. Batch had even considered building a subdivision.
Thus, the need for the parkway "[arose] not as a result of [Dr.
Batch's] subdivision plan, but because of pre-existing traffic congestion."4 ° Additionally, town plans indicated that the parkway
would be a limited access parkway which residents of the subdivision would be unable to access and that the plans for the parkway
were indefinite as to timing and financing. 4 1 This evidence clearly
indicated to the court that there was no connection between the
condition and the regulation.4 2 Thus, the court held that the con35. Id. at 621, 376 S.E.2d at 34. A close read of the test adopted by the North
Carolina Court of Appeals reveals that it is not the exact same test adopted by

the U.S. Supreme Court in Nollan. Part II of this note will analyze the
differences more closely.
36. Id.

37. Id. at 622, 376 S.E.2d at 34-35. See infra text accompanying note 68.
38. Batch, 92 N.C. App. at 622, 376 S.E.2d at 35.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 618, 376 S.E.2d at 32.

41. Id.
42. Id. at 619, 376 S.E.2d at 33.
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dition as imposed was an unlawful exaction and the Chapel Hill
Town Council could not constitutionally deny Dr. Batch's permit
for failure to comply with the condition.4 3 The North Carolina
Court of Appeals grappled with the issue of what constituted an
unconstitutional exaction and wrote an intelligent opinion applying the law in an area of first impression. The North Carolina
Supreme Court was not so brave.
C. The Opinion of the North Carolina Supreme Court
The North Carolina Supreme Court framed the entire issue as
"whether the proceeding pursuant to [Dr. Batch's] petition for writ
of certiorari to review the decision of the Town of Chapel Hill
which denied [Dr. Batch's] subdivision permit application was
properly joined with her cause of action alleging in her complaint
constitutional violations."4 4 The court held that the proceedings
were improperly joined. It concluded that the writ of certiorari
should have been denied and that the order denying Dr. Batch's
application should have been upheld.4 5 Likewise, it concluded
that Dr. Batch's motion for summary judgment should have been
denied.4 6
The court began by addressing the joinder issue. It held that
in reviewing the denial of the subdivision permit, the trial court
was sitting as an appellate court because it was reviewing a quasijudicial hearing decision. 4 7 Thus, it could not properly grant summary judgment. Additionally, it could not substitute its findings
of fact for those of the Town Council. 48 Thus, the court held that if
"even one of the reasons articulated by the town for denial of the
subdivision permit is supported by... competent evidence on the
record, the town's decision must be affirmed."4 9
The Court then ruled that there was "no evidence in the record before the Town Council of any efforts on behalf of the town to
require [Dr. Batch] to dedicate land for the right-of-way of Laurel
Hill Parkway as a condition for approval of [Dr. Batch's] proposed
43. Id. at 622, 376 S.E.2d at 35.
44. Batch, 326 N.C. at 3-4., 387 S.E.2d at 656.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 11.
48. Id. at 12, 387 S.E.2d at 662 (citing Jamison v. Kyles, 271 N.C. 722, 157
S.E.2d 550 (1967)).
49. Id (citing Jennewin v. City Council of Wilmington, 62 N.C.App. 89, 93,
302 S.E.2d 7, 9 (1983)).
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subdivision." 50 It was the trial court that found this to be the fact
and imposed it over the Town Council's finding that "the development does not have streets which coordinate with existing and
planned streets and highways."51
The court then ruled that as long as this finding by the Town
Council is based on competent, material, and substantial evidence, it is a sufficient basis to support the denial of the subdivision application. The court found it to be sufficient because the
Chapel Hill Town Ordinance5 2 "expressly requires that subdivision plans for streets and driveways ... be in compliance with and
coordinate to Chapel Hill's transportation plan."5 3 Thus, the court
held that since Dr. Batch's subdivision application failed to "take
into account" future road plans as set forth in the Thoroughfare
Plan, it was validly denied.5 4
The court then indicated that the only further inquiry that
needed to be made was whether the town "had the authority to
impose such a requirement and whether the town's resolution
supporting the permit denial was unconstitutionally vague.
The court pointed to N.C.G.S. § 160A-372 which authorizes a
developer to take future and present road development into
account when designing a subdivision. The court then declared
without explanation that "a requirement that a subdivision design
accommodate future road plans is not necessarily tantamount to
compulsory dedication. '5 6 Thus, the Town of Chapel Hill had
authority to require Dr. Batch to "take future road plans into
account" and was not unconstitutionally vague in denying her permit for that reason. 57 The court ruled that it was unnecessary to
decide any of Dr. Batch's constitutional claims and that summary
judgment should have been entered for the Town of Chapel Hill
since the "foundation of [Dr. Batch's] causes of action ha[d] been
determined against [her]."58

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Batch, 326 N.C. at 7, 387 S.E.2d at 659 (emphasis added).
Id. at 12, 387 S.E.2d at 662.
Development Ordinance, § 6.5.1.
Batch, 326 N.C. at 13, 387 S.E.2d at 663.
Id. at 12, 387 S.E.2d at 662.
Id. at 13, 387 S.E.2d at 663.
Id.
Id. at 14, 387 S.E.2d at 663.
Id.
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The court stated that its decision was based "solely upon adequate and independent state grounds."59 In making such a statement, the court was indicating to Dr. Batch and to the federal
courts that the issue of whether there had been an unconstitutional taking had been laid permanently to rest.
D. Analysis of Dr. Batch's Takings Claim
Unfortunately for the North Carolina Supreme Court, the federal courts did not view the court's decision in Batch with the
same air of finality. Dr. Batch filed a complaint in federal district

court alleging that her property was taken without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.60 The district court dismissed her case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the
Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished disposition, reversed the district court and held that the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled
only on the denial of Dr. Batch's subdivision application. 61 Thus,
it never finally resolved her takings claim. Although the North
Carolina Supreme Court thought it had disposed of the case on
independent state law grounds, the Fourth Circuit made clear
that the North Carolina Supreme Court "did not address the issue
of whether the planned thoroughfare-along with its accompanying limitations and restrictions on the use of her property-constituted a taking without just compensation." 62 The Fourth Circuit

remanded the case for consideration of the takings claim, noting
that there is a "distinction between the denial of the subdivision
permit application and the possible consequences that may result
from the planned thoroughfare through Batch's property."63
Thus, Dr. Batch's taking claim is very much alive. Had the
North Carolina Supreme Court ruled on the constitutional issue
when it had the chance, the court could have played a role in
resolving a part of North Carolina property law that is currently
undecided. Since the Batch decision, no North Carolina case has
addressed this same issue, and nationally, few courts have ruled

on the subject of unconstitutional exactions. A thoughtful application of recent United Supreme Court decisions in the takings law
area indicate however, that the North Carolina Court of Appeals
59. Batch, 326 N.C. at 15, 387 S.E.2d at 664 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032 (1983)).
60. Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 55 F.3d 772 (1995) (per curiam).
61. Id. at 4.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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was correct. Dr. Batch did establish that her land had been
unconstitutionally taken.
E.

Dr. Batch Established an UnconstitutionalExaction

[An exaction is a condition of development permission that
requires a public facility or improvement to be provided at the
developer's expense.6 4 Virtually unheard of fifty years ago, exactions have become the method of choice among towns, low on

finances, to accomplish needed community improvements without
spending money.6 5 Thus, towns began conditioning the grant of a
subdivision permit on requirements that the developers provide
certain services, such as: expanding bordering roads, reserving
land for community parks, or dedicating strips of land for new
road construction. 66 More recent exactions have required developers to pay fees rather than provide services. The constitutionality
of exactions is a relatively new body of law. Developers are only
recently beginning to challenge exactions as unconstitutional
infringements on their rights as landowners.
Until the landmark United States Supreme Court decisions in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission67 and Dolan v. City of
Tigard,68 state courts generally held that any exaction was constitutional so long as it was reasonably related to a government
planning goal. The decisions in Nollan and Dolan reflected the
United States Supreme Court's belief that the relative ease with
which states could prove that an exaction bore a reasonable relationship to a governmental planning goal was resulting in an
unfair burden upon private individuals to shoulder costs that
should have been born by the public.
Nollan established that for an exaction to be constitutional,
there had to be an "essential nexus" between the exaction and a
substantial government interest.6 9 Dolan added a second part to
the Nollan test and held that even if an essential nexus is established between the condition imposed and a legitimate state inter64. Batch, 92 N.C. App. at 613, 376 S.E.2d at 30 (citing, Ducker, Taking
Found for Beach Access Dedication Requirement, 30 Loc. GOVT LAW BUL. 2
(1987).
65. CuRTIs J. BERGER & JOAN C. WILLIAMS, PROPERTY- LAND OWNERSHIP AND
USE 910-911 (4th ed. 1997).
66. Id.
67. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
68. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
69. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
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est, the exaction is still unconstitutional absent a showing that
the required dedication bears a "rough proportionality" to the
impact the development will bring.7 °
In the Batcj case, the North Carolina Supreme Court determined that Dr. Batch was refused a subdivision permit because
she failed to "take into account" the proposed Laurel Hill Parkway. 7 ' Although the Court of Appeals found that the application
was denied because of failure to "dedicate" a right-of-way to the
town,7 2 the ruling of the North Carolina Supreme Court is binding
because the issue of whether her subdivision application was
properly denied was fully adjudicated by that court. Therefore,
before the Nollan and Dolan tests can be applied, a more fundamental question must be answered. Does the condition that
required Dr. Batch to "take into account" the proposed Laurel Hill
Parkway in order to receive her subdivision permit constitute an
exaction?
The North Carolina Supreme Court said no without stating
why accommodation of future road plans is not the same thing as
dedication of land for future roads. Clearly, had the Town voiced
its denial of Dr. Batch's application in terms of "failure to dedicate
land for a future highway" no one would have thought the condition anything other than an exaction. Simple analysis of what Dr.
Batch would be required to do in order to "take into account" the
proposed parkway indicates that such a condition is identical in
form to a requirement of dedication.
The Chapel Hill Town Thoroughfare Plan showed that a strip
of land seventy feet wide running through the center of Dr.
Batch's land would be part of the future Laurel Hill Parkway.
Such a designation of land interfered with Dr. Batch's subdivision
plan because it ran through the center of 3 of her 11 lots and ran
over a cul-de-sac accessing 4 of her lots. Because her subdivision
application was denied for failure to take this proposed parkway
into consideration, it is obvious what Dr. Batch would have had to
do to bring her plan into conformity with the town Thoroughfare
Plan. She would have had to redesign her subdivision so that the
seventy-foot strip of land was unused. This would have required
re-dividing the land into lots that did not overlap with the strip of
land and re-routing roads so as not to cross that strip of land. The
70. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
71. Batch, 326 N.C. at 12, 387 S.E.2d at 662.
72. Batch, 92 N.C. App. at 610, 376 S.E.2d at 28.
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net result was that Dr. Batch lost the use of this strip of land; the
same as if it had been required as a dedication.
Although this is sufficient to qualify the condition as an exaction, further analysis makes such reasoning even clearer. Had Dr.
Batch been required to dedicate the seventy-foot strip, the title
would have passed to the Town of Chapel Hill. But as the Town of
Chapel Hill conditioned it: she would retain title to the land, but
would have to take the proposed highway into account for the
Town. So what happens if the Town of Chapel Hill eventually
decides to build the Laurel Hill Parkway? Is the town then going
to pay Dr. Batch for the strip of land? Of course not, the town will
merely come through and build the road on the strip of land that
Dr. Batch so conveniently "accounted" for. If the town intended to
pay Dr. Batch for the strip of land, it would never have required
that she account for it. Rather at the time it decided to build the
road, the town would have exercised its right of eminent domain
and purchased the strip from Dr. Batch. It is precisely because
the town would not pay for the strip of land that it required Dr.
Batch to "account" for it. Such a condition has all the markings of
an exaction.
Thus, having concluded that the condition imposed on Dr.
Batch was in fact an exaction, the next step in determining
whether such an exaction is constitutional is applying the NollanDolan tests. Under Nollan, the exaction imposed must bear an
essential nexus to a legitimate state interest. The exaction
imposed was that Dr. Batch "dedicate, accommodate or reserve a
right-of-way to coordinate her plan with the Town of Chapel Hill
Thoroughfare Plan."7 3 The legitimate state interest that the
Town of Chapel Hill sought to advance was that a subdivision's
streets and driveways must be in compliance with and coordinated with town planning. 4 Does an essential nexus exist
73. Batch, 92 N.C. App. at 621, 376 S.E.2d at 34.
74. The basis for this state interest can be found in § 6.5.1 and § 7.7.1 of the
Chapel Hill Development Ordinance. § 6.5.1 states, "The type and arrangement
of streets and driveways within the development shall be in compliance with and
coordinate to Chapel Hill's Transportation Plan." § 7.7.1 reads as follows:
The subdivision should be designed with a street network which
provides care, adequate access to all lots within the subdivision, and to
properties adjoining the subdivision where such access is deemed
desirable for the orderly future development of these properties.
However, the design of the street network in a subdivision should not
encourage through traffic (the origins and destination of which are
external to the subdivision) to use local roads in a subdivision. Further,
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between this exaction and the proffered state interest? To answer
this question, a determination must be made as to whether a
requirement that land "account" for a proposed highway substantially advances a governmental interest in having all roads comply or coordinate with a comprehensive plan. Certainly an
argument can be made that it does, and that failure to coordinate
subdivision road plans with town road plans would result in a tangled web of conflicting streets. This reasoning would be persuasive were it not for the fact that the Laurel Hill Parkway was not
an existing road. It was not even a road planned for construction.
Rather it was a road listed on the Official Map Act as a road that
could possibly be built at some point in the future. In fact, today
fifteen years after the Thoroughfare Plan was adopted, the Laurel
Hill Parkway still is not under construction. Therefore, requiring
Dr. Batch to "take into account" a proposed road does not substantially advance a governmental interest in maintaining conformity
among roads when the road that the subdivision must conform
with is not even under construction. Therefore, the Nollan test is
not met.
However, even if the Nollan test was satisfied, the exaction
required of Dr. Batch would still be unconstitutional because it
would fail the Dolan test. 75 The Dolan test requires that the exaction imposed bear "rough proportionality" to the projected impacts
of the proposed development.7 6 Thus, "the city must make some
sort of individualized determination that the required dedication
is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development." 7 7 The exaction imposed on Dr. Batch fails this test.
First, the Laurel Hill Parkway was planned before Dr. Batch even
submitted a subdivision application.78 Thus, "the Laurel Hill
Parkway was designed to serve a public need completely distinct
from and significantly greater than any need which might be crethe various streets, utilities, recreation areas and other community
facilities serving a subdivision should be sized and located in conformity
with the Comprehensive Plan.
75. It is important to note that when the Batch case was decided in 1990, the
decision in Dolan had not yet been handed down. The Dolan decision did not
come until 1994. However, the 4th Circuit issued its unpublished disposition in
1995 indicating that the federal courts would hear Dr. Batch's constitutional
claim, so the Dolan decision is clearly applicable in determining if an exaction is
unconstitutional.
76. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
77. Id.

78. Batch, 326 N.C. at 4, 387 S.E.2d at 657.
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ated by [Dr. Batch's] subdivision." 79 The Thoroughfare Plan itself
states that the purpose of the parkway is to "alleviate traffic congestion on Highway 15-501 created by new outlying subdivisions. "s° Additionally, the proposed parkway would be limited
access, thereby virtually guaranteeing that no trips from the subdivision would be made on the parkway."' Given these facts, it is
quite obvious that the required exaction is in no way related to the
impact of the subdivision. The need for the parkway was caused
by pre-existing conditions.8 2 The subdivision will not even be
allowed access to the parkway. Therefore, the exaction is not
"roughly proportionate" to the impact of the subdivision as
required by Dolan and is unconstitutional.
The Court of Appeals decided this case without the benefit of
the Dolan decision. It is interesting to note that in formulating its
own test for determining if an exaction is unconstitutional, the
court adopted the essential nexus test set forth by Nollan, but
added to the test a second prong. The Court of Appeals held that
not only did the condition imposed have to substantially advance a
legitimate state interest, it had to be "proportionally related to the
impact of the development."8 3 Upon examination this second

prong is almost identical to the "rough proportionality" test
adopted by Dolan. Thus, the Court of Appeals issued an insightful
ruling that would still hold up in post-Dolan deliberations.
The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the condition
imposed on Dr. Batch was an unconstitutional exaction. The only
error that the court made was in assuming that the condition
imposed was an exaction without analyzing why. However, appropriate analysis indicates that the condition imposed was an exac79. Appellee's Brief to North Carolina Court of Appeals at 7, Batch v. Town of
Chapel Hill, 92 N.C. App. 601 (1989) (No. 8815SC340).
80. Id. The Thoroughfare plan reads fully in regards to the Laurel Hill
Parkway:
"This improvement would provide an alternative for some traffic which
would otherwise use the bypass. More importantly, it would postpone
severe congestion problems anticipated for the intersection of Mt.
Carmel Church Road, U.S. 15-501 South, and the Bypass. It would
provide the means for moving between outlaying [sic] development
without needing to use central area streets. . . The highest use is
projected near Jones Ferry Road due to expected commercial
development in the area." Thoroughfare Plan, p.7.
81. Batch, 92 N.C. App. at 618, 376 S.E.2d at 32.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 621, 376 S.E.2d at 34.
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tion and that such exaction was unconstitutional because it failed
to meet the tests set out by Nollan and Dolan.
F. Dr. Batch Established an Unconstitutional Temporary
Taking
Because the condition imposed by the Town of Chapel Hill
was an unconstitutional exaction, Dr. Batch also has the right to
pursue a claim that the denial of her subdivision application constituted a temporary taking. First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 4 holds that if a regulation was
determined to be invalid, the owner of the property might be entitled to damages on the theory that a temporary taking had
occurred. Chief Justice Rehnquist states "[w]here this burden
results from governmental action that amount[s] to a taking, the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that
the government pay the landowner for the value of the use of the
land during this period." 5
Thus, Dr. Batch is entitled to compensation for the loss of the
use of her land resulting from the imposition of an unconstitutional exaction. The interesting question then becomes: how do
we value the lost use of land? A plausible argument can be made
that Dr. Batch lost the ability to build a subdivision and is entitled
to damages based on such loss. The problem is complicated by the
fact that in order to decide the full extent of the temporary taking,
the number of years Dr. Batch was prevented by the Town of
Chapel Hill from using the strip of land must be determined.
Additionally, it will be difficult for Dr. Batch to prove what value
should be assigned to a lost ability to build a subdivision for a
certain number of years. But the basic argument itself is sound.
The exaction only related to a seventy-foot strip of land, but the
effect of the exaction prevented Dr. Batch from using any of her
property to build a subdivision. Thus, the regulation of the seventy-foot strip effectively regulated the whole twenty-acre parcel.
A more moderate approach to determining the damages suffered by Dr. Batch would be to value the loss of just the seventyfoot strip of land and not the resulting loss of value of the whole
tract. Since any application Dr. Batch submitted would have been
denied unless the seventy-foot strip was accounted for, the only
true loss Dr. Batch suffered was the right to use the seventy-foot
84. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
85. Id. at 319.
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strip of land. Proponents of this view would argue that while this
case was pending, Dr. Batch could have submitted a revised application taking into account the seventy-foot strip of land, obtained
a permit, and begun building on the unaffected land.
It seems, however, patently unfair to expect Dr. Batch to
build around an exaction that is unconstitutional. Dr. Batch
should have the right to wait for a full adjudication of her takings
claim before making plans to alter her proposed use of the land.
Therefore, the resulting loss of land should be valued by the overall effect such loss caused her property.
Allowing Dr. Batch to recover for a temporary taking based on
a finding that the exaction imposed was unconstitutional has the
desirable effect of making local governments analyze more carefully a regulation or exaction that they may wish to impose. Without allowing damages for a temporary taking, a town has no
incentive to be careful about exactions it imposes. It can impose
an exaction, sit back, and wait for the developer to either meet the
condition or bring a lawsuit. If a lawsuit is filed and the town
loses in court, then the only effect on the town is that it cannot
impose the exaction. Allowing damages for the temporary taking
that resulted while the developer was forced to bring a lawsuit
punishes the town for its unconstitutional act.
CONCLUSION

The North Carolina Supreme Court erred by failing to
address Dr. Batch's constitutional claim. The issue of whether an
exaction is unconstitutional is an increasingly important question
in the minds of property owners and developers alike. As society
grows, the residential location of choice for accommodating such
expansion is the subdivision. Thus, towns view the granting of
subdivision permits as the perfect way to make developers pay for
needed community improvements. While this "I'll do something
for you if you do something for me" mentality may be appropriate
in some circumstances, courts should never lose sight of the fact
that the land upon which the exaction is imposed belongs to a private citizen. There must be strict and well-defined guidelines regulating the kinds of conditions a town may constitutionally impose
upon the development of privately held land. North Carolina
courts must be willing to address unlawful exaction claims so that
developers may be assured that the courts will provide relief when
a town has overstepped its constitutional limits.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol21/iss1/5
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In Dr. Batch's case, the Town of Chapel Hill required the dedication of a strip of land for future highway use. A requirement of
dedication should almost always be an unconstitutional exaction.
Dedication is perhaps the most abhorrent form of regulation
because it deprives the landowner of his most fundamental ownership right- the right to exclude others from his land. While it is
understandable that towns may not always have the funds to
finance highway construction entirely on their own, a town should
first determine if other exactions exist that would provide a more
reasonable alternative to a requirement of dedication. For example, a town could require that a fee be added onto the price of each
lot in a subdivision payable to the town upon sale of the lot. Then
the town could exercise its right of eminent domain when ready to
build a road and use the fees to pay for the condemned land. However, even when an exaction takes the form of a fee, it still must
meet constitutionality requirements.
The North Carolina Supreme Court should have applied Nollan and Dolan to the facts in Dr. Batch's takings claim and held
that the Town of Chapel Hill imposed an unconstitutional exaction. Had they done so, this case would have been over in 1990
instead of still dragging on today. The person hurt most by the
court's indecisiveness is Dr. Batch, the landowner the court is obligated to protect.
Elizabeth K. Arias
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